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1 Introduction
The objective of fiscal equalization, which is implemented in many federal and decen-
tralized unitary countries1 is to give sub-national regions (e.g. states, provinces or local
governments) comparable capacities to provide local public services without imposing
different tax burdens on their populations. The representative tax system, or RTS, is
the standard approach used to achieve equalization. It usually is embedded within a
broader tax revenue sharing structure established between central and regional govern-
ments. Under the RTS approach a region is compensated through transfers from the
centre for any difference between the revenue raised when average regional tax rates
are applied to its tax bases and the revenue raised when average tax rates are applied
to the tax bases of all regions. This difference is positive for low income regions - they
have a positive revenue need - and it is negative for relatively high income regions who
are assessed to have a negative revenue need.
Equalization schemes are, therefore, implicitly redistributive between regions. In-
deed, this is necessary in order to achieve their (equity) objective of ensuring sub-
national regions have comparable fiscal capacities.
∗Email: F.Chan@curtin.edu.au or J.Petchey@curtin.edu.au.
1Notable examples include Germany, Japan, China, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom
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Weingast (2009) has argued that the inter-regional redistribution arising from equal-
ization creates disincentives for regions to develop their economies over time and that
this adversely affects economic growth. He illustrates the idea with an example based
on the “fiscal law of 1/n” that supposes there are n provinces with the average province
receiving 1/n of some total revenue pool regardless of its own policies. Weingast (2009)
then supposes a province adopts growth enhancing policies which increase its revenue
base and argues that “... the province receives 1/n of the total increase in revenue
generated solely from its increased investment in the local economy. The province
bears the full expenses for the market-enhancing public goods but captures only 1/n
of the fiscal return.”2 He also notes that: “... fiscal systems that allow growing regions
to capture a major portion of new revenue generated by economic growth provide far
stronger incentives for local governments to foster local economic growth.”3
This raises an important question, namely, could the redistribution arising from
fiscal equalization in practice have adverse consequences for the rate of growth in total
output over time? The economics literature on this question is sketchy. Some research
has examined the impact of federalism and decentralization, though not equalization,
on inter-temporal per capita income. We refer here, for example, to Zhang and Zou
(1999), Xie et al. (1999), Akai and Sakata (2002), Brueckner (2006) and Thornton
(2007). As far as we are aware, only Ogawa and Yakita (2009) and Cyrenne and
Pandy (2013) have examined the relationship between equalization and inter-temporal
per capita income. However, Ogawa and Yakita (2009) focus on equalization and the
convergence of regional economies while Cyrenne and Pandy (2013) examine equaliza-
tion and the composition of government spending. This leads us to agree with the
point made by Fischer and Ulrich (2011) that “... the existing theoretical....growth
literature that incorporates vertical or horizontal transfers across government tiers is
scant.”4
The contribution of this note is to shed some light on this question. We do this
by first presenting a case study of the inter-regional redistribution induced by fiscal
equalization in Australia. This country is chosen because, as will be explained in
the paper, it has the most comprehensive of all equalization systems and serves to
2Weingast (2009) pages 283 and 284. See also Careaga and Weingast (2003) for an analysis of the
law of 1/n as it applies to redistributive policies generally.
3Weingast (2009) page 284.
4Fischer and Ulrich (2011) page 4.
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highlight the empirical magnitude of the inter-regional redistribution that can arise
from equalization of fiscal capacities. This degree of redistribution will be replicated,
to varying degress, in any country with equalization across its regions. The case study
therefore provides some context to the paper and its results by showing how important
the transfers induced by equalization can be in practice.
We then construct an economic model with regions linked through an RTS equal-
ization scheme. Regional economies are also subject to economic growth dynamics.
Each region is assumed to maximize its inter-temporal social welfare over a fixed time
horizon by choosing an optimal saving rate. This will then determine capital accumu-
lation, investment and output over the same period. The choice of a fixed time horizon
is justified by two practical considerations. Firstly, saving rates cannot be changed
instantaneously in practice and are often chosen for a fixed period of time. Secondly,
the regional government itself may change over time depending on the outcome of re-
gional elections which usually occur at regular intervals. It is assumed that when a new
regional government takes office, it will determine its main policies for the duration of
its term, including its savings and capital accumulation plans. In this sense our fixed
term horizon may correspond to an election cycle.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time an RTS equalization scheme
has been embedded within an inter-temporal model with the aim of examining how
equalization affects investment, savings and the rate of growth in total output over
time. That said, it is true that inter-regional transfer rules have been studied in the
literature on monetary unions and fiscal federalism. For example, Evers (2012) inte-
grates an inter-regional transfer rule within an inter-temporal macroeconomic model.
The transfer is a function of differences in various regional macroeconomic variables,
including nominal GDP, private consumption spending, labour income and regional
deficits. Similarly, Evers (2015) incorporates a regional transfer rule into an inter-
temporal macroeconomic model that equalizes regional nominal tax revenues. These
policy rules are designed to use inter-regional transfers as stabilizers in the face of
region-specific shocks. Though RTS-type equalization can have this impact as a side
effect stabilization is not its objective. Rather, as noted above, RTS equalization is
designed with an equity goal in mind: to equalize fiscal capacities. In addition, these
papers do not allow for regions to act strategically with respect to the transfer rule.
Hence, though interesting the results in this literature are not directly relevant or
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comparable to what we attempt to achieve.
With this in mind, our main contribution is to show that RTS-type fiscal equal-
ization provides incentives for regions to reduce saving rates below what they would
choose in the absence of equalization. Since regional capital accumulation and per
capita output are increasing in savings rates, this also means that capital spending and
per capita output are lower over time than otherwise. It is also the case that the growth
rate in total output is lower when regions are subject to equalization. We conclude,
therefore, that when considered in an inter-temporal context, equalization may reduce
incentives for regions to develop their economies, as suggested by Weingast (2009).
We qualify this finding and put it into further context in the Conclusion. There
it is argued that any inter-temporal growth costs of equalizaton, such as identified in
this note, must be weighed against the possibile benefits of equalization, which may
be considerable. They arise from inter-regional equity considerations and the possible
efficiency gains related to factor mobility identified elswhere in the fiscal federalism and
public economics literatures over a substantial period of time (see Conclusion).
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the case study. Section 3
develops a model of an inter-temporal economy with regions and RTS-type fical equal-
isation. In Section 4, we analyse a policy game between regions in which they choose
their savings rates to maximize regional social welfare. This section also presents the
results while Section 5 concludes. Most technical details are relegated to appendices.
2 Case Study: Equalization in practice
Australia has eight states subject to centrally mandated fiscal equalization.5 The
country is considered to have the most comprehensive fiscal equalisation scheme in the
world for two main reasons. First, the Australian approach raises all states to the
fiscal capacity of the strongest rather than the average. Hence, the redistributive task
required by the Australian approach in order to achieve equalization is large. Second,
it measures all revenue and expenditure needs thus making it a technically demanding
and detailed approach which is seen as a benchmark in the practice of equalization.
5The states are: New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia,
Tasmania, the Norther Territory and the Australian Capital Territory. Technically, the last two of
these are territories, but for the purposes of equalization they are treated as states. This is why they
are referred to as states in this paper.
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These features make the Australian model of particular interest as a case study to
provide context for our theoretical results. Elements of the Australian model are to be
found in all equalization schemes adopoted world-wide.
To be more specific, the Australian scheme applies the principles of equalization in
allocating the Goods and Services Tax (GST) revenue pool to the states.6 In 2015-16,
the GST pool was approximately $57.2 billion. The Australian model breaks equalisa-
tion down into three steps. In the first, states with relatively low fiscal capacities, the
Northern Territory, Tasmania, South Australia and Queensland, are raised to the av-
erage fiscal capacity of all states. This ensures that the States with relatively low fiscal
capacities can provide the average standard of services without imposing a higher than
averge tax burden on their citizens. In the second step, all states, except the fiscally
strongest, are raised to the fiscal capacity of the strongest state, currently Western
Australia.7 The final step sees any revenue left over in the GST pool after Steps 1 and
2 allocated to all states on an equal per capita basis.
After equalization, all Australian States have a fiscal capacity comparable to that
of the fiscally strongest state, Western Australia. During the financial year 2015-16,
12% of the GST pool, or $6.8 billion, was used for the first step, and 58%, or $33.2
billion, for the second step. Hence, achieving the total equalization task consumed 70%
of the GST pool or $40.0 billion in 2015-16. This equates to about 2.4% of Australia’s
GDP. The remaining 30% of the GST pool, or $12.2 billion, was allocated to the states
on an equal per capita basis.8 The GST pool in Australia is more than sufficient to
bring all states up to the fiscal capacity of the strongest state. This is unlike some
other countries that adopt equalization in some form, for example China, where the
pool of revenue available for distribution from the national government is insufficient
to achieve such a comprehensive degree of equalization (see Wang and Herd (2013)).
To illustrate further, the per capita amounts allocated to the Australian states for
Steps 1 and 2 combined (the total equalization task), and Step 3 (the equal per capita
part of the allocation), are illustrated in Table 1 for the financial year 2015-16. Since
it is the fiscally strongest, Western Australia received nothing from the GST pool to
complete the total equalization task (Row 1) while the other states received positive
6See Commonwealth Grants Commission (2015b) for detailed discussion.
7Historically, this been either Victoria or New South Wales. However, as a result of a resources
boom, this position is now occuppied by Western Australia.
8See Commonwealth Grants Commission (2015b), Chapter 3, Box 1 for further explanation.
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per capita amounts, with the grant to each depending on its assessed fiscal capacity
relative to the average for all States. Finally, all states received $714 per capita from
Step 3, the equal per capita allocation.
Table 1: Allocation of the GST pool under equalization: The three steps, $pc, 2015-16
NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT Average
$pc $pc $pc $pc $pc $pc $pc $pc $pc
Total HFE task: 1,540 1,410 1,969 0 2,519 3,614 1,904 12,539 1,656
Equal per capita: 714 714 714 714 714 714 714 714 714
Total grant 2,254 2,123 2,682 714 3,233 4,328 2,617 13,252 2,370
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission (2015b), Table 1, Chapter 3, page 76.
The final per capita grants from the GST pool are shown in the last row. They differ
based on the relative fiscal capacities of the states before equalization. The Northern
Territory received 18.56 times the per capita grant of Western Australia in order to raise
its fiscal capacity to that of Western Australia. Tasmania and South Australia each
received 5.06 and 3.52 times respectively the per capita grant of Western Australia.
It is clear from this discussion that equalization in Australia requires substantial
redistribution between states, most notably from Western Australia but also New South
Wales and Victoria, to the remaining states. The redistributive task is comparatively
large because the Australian system brings all states up to the fiscal capacity of the
strongest state. Though the Australian case may be an outlier in this particular sense,
equalization will to some degree induce inter-regional redistribution in any economy
that adopts it.9 Indeed, it must do so in order to achieve equalization of fiscal capacities
across economically disparate regions.
The question we now address in the next Sections of the note is whether the redis-
tribution we observe in this case study has the potential, at least in theory, to affect
savings, capital accumulation and growth in total output over time.
9Some of the history of how the Australian scheme evolved, including a discussion of its compre-
hensiveness in terms of equalizing to the standard of the strongest state, can be found in Australian
Government (2012), in particular Chapter 3.
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3 An inter-temporal regional economy with equalization
In this Section, we develop a model of an inter-temporal regional economy, which can
be thought of as a federation, a regional union of nation-states or a unitary country
with local jurisdictions. The economy is assumed to have two regions, j = 1, 2. It is
also assumed there is a centrally mandated RTS-style equalization scheme in place that
redistributes from high to low income regions. Let Yj(t), Kj(t), Lj(t) and Aj(t) denote
the output, capital stock, labour and technology of region j at time t, respectively.
The change in capital stock in region j is assumed to follow
Kj,t(t) = sjYj(t)− θjKj(t) (3.1)
where Kj,t(t) is the time derivative of Kj(t) with sj and θj denote the saving and
depreciation rates, respectively. The model also assumes a citizen supplies a fixed unit
of labour so Lj(t) is also the population of region j. We also assume both labour supply
and knowledge grow at constant rates with the following dynamics,
Lj,t =(1 + nj)Lj(t) (3.2)
Aj,t =(1 + gj)Aj(t), (3.3)
and output of region j is given by Yj(t) = Yj(Aj(t), Lj(t), Kj(t)). These specification
are consistent with the Solow-Swan growth model. For more details, see, for example,
Romer (2001). In the Solow-Swan model, however, the saving rate, sj, is exogenous.
In our model, we make the savings rate in each region a choice variable chosen by the
region’s goverrment to maximise its social welfare over a fixed horizon, t = 0, ...., T .
This is justified supposing that the total saving rate for a region’s economy, sj,
is a combination of its public and private savings rates. Thus, the role of a regional
government is to determine its separate public savings rate conditional on some given,
and constant, private saving rate. Further, regions are assumed to make this choice
such that the total savings rate in their region is consistent with sj. It is this assumed
ability of regions to choose their economy’s total savings rate which allows them to act
strategically in order to manipulate equalisation transfers in their favour. As will be
seen, the ability of regions to choose their total savings rate for a given private saving
rate, underpins the results of the paper.
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Having developed the dynamics of the regional economy we now introduce and
embed the RTS-type equalisation rule. The formal derivation of this policy rule can
be found in Appendix A. The basic idea is that the central government appropriates
some portion of the per capita output of region j at a given rate which is the same
across regions. The revenue collected by the centre (for example, this could be the GST
pool in Australia) is then redistributed to the regions using lump-sum unconditional
grants that equalize for revenue needs consistent with the RTS approach based on
different revenue needs. Hence, each region makes a per capita contribution to the
central revenue pool and receives a grant from it, with its net transfer, denoted as ρj,
equal to the difference between the two. As shown in Appendix A, the net transfer
under the assumed RTS scheme can be expressed as
ρj(t) =
(
1− Yj(t)
Lj(t)
L(t)
Y (t)
)
Q(t)
L(t)
, (3.4)
where Y (t) = Y1(t) + Y2(t) is the total national outputs, L(t) = L1(t) + L2(t) is the
total national population and Q(t) is the total national expenditure on public goods.
As will be shown below, this introduces strategic opportunities for regions since they
can manipulate the net transfers through the choice of saving rates. Distortions arising
from this strategic behaviour over net transfers are the prime interest in this paper.
When regions are asymmetric, as when they have different production technologies,
the contribution of a particular region to the pool relative to what it gets back by
way of an equalization grant will be different. This is because they will each make
divergent per capita contributions to the pool and receive different equalization grants
based on the RTS approach. For these reasons, the net transfer received by a region
will be positive or negative. What is more, as shown in Appendix A the net transfer
received by region j must have the opposite sign to the net transfer received by region
i where i = 1, 2 and i 6= j. The sum of the net transfers must also be equal to zero.
Furthermore, a relatively low income region will have a positive net transfer, adding
to its locally produced output, while a comparatively high income region will have a
negative net transfer, detracting from its produced output.
This is a simplified role for the central government. Its only function is to tax
citizens at a given rate in order to create a central revenue pool and then provide
equalization grants to regions using the given RTS scheme described in Appendix A.
Unlike regions, the centre makes no behavioural choices. Specifically, it does not provide
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national public goods or undertake any other form of redistribution.
Moreover, the centre does not implement an optimal equalization rule derived from
maximizing national social welfare. Rather, the equalization policy rule is given and
based on the real-world RTS scheme that we see in practice. These choices are delib-
erate simplifications which allow us to focus on how regional behaviour is affected by
an RTS-type equalization policy rule in an inter-temporal context.
Given this set up, we now complete the model specification by describing how
income for citizens in each region is determined. We also develop an inter-temporal
social welfare function for each region that takes account of regional economic dynamics
and equalization. This provides a basis for the regional optimization problem in the
next Section and the results presented and discussed there.
Income available in each region for conversion into public goods and consumption,
denoted pij for j = 1, 2, is the sum of produced output less saving and the net transfer,
ρj, described above. The budget constraint of region j at a particular point in time is
therefore
xj(t) + cjqj(t) = (1− sj)Yj(t) + Lj(t)ρj(t) (3.5)
where xj(t) and qj(t) denotes private and public goods, respectively, with cj represents
the relative price of public goods to private good. In other words, the price of private
goods is being normalised to one.
Let uj [xj(t), qj(t)] denotes the utility function of a representative citizen in region
j. Regions are assumed to provide local public goods consistent with a first-best rule.
In other words, the local public goods provided by region j, q∗j (t), along with the
local private goods, x∗j(t), maximise the utility function, uj(t), subject to the budget
constraint as stated in equation (3.5). Expressions for the provision of local public
goods consistent with this are provided in Appendix B. The indirect utility function
for region j can then be obtained by
Vj(t) = uj
[
x∗j(t), q
∗
j (t)
]
. (3.6)
Social welfare in region j is defined as the weighted sum of indirect utility of a
representative citizen:
Wj (t) =
∫ T
0
exp (−δt)Vj (t) dt (3.7)
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where t = 0, ..., T is some fixed horizon. Since regional governments are assumed to be
benevolent, making their choice of saving rate to maximize social welfare within their
own region, equation (3.6) also defines the objective function for the government of
region j where j = 1, 2. That is, region j chooses sj to maximize inter-temporal social
welfare consistent with the growth dynamics and net inter-regional transfer incorpo-
rated into equation (3.6).
This completes the specification of the inter-temporal regional economy with equal-
ization. The next Section develops a policy game between regions and presents results.
4 Policy game and results
From the discussion above, the net transfer received by a region is a function of out-
puts from both regions implying that equalization creates interdependence between the
policy choices made by regions. We now capture this in a game where regions choose
their saving rates as Nash competitors. This means each region chooses its saving rate
for a given choice in the other region. In this game, regions are assumed to correctly
anticipate the impact of their saving rate choices on ρj(t), their net transfer.
By solving the resulting maximization problem of each region we are able to obtain
first order necessary conditions or best response functions for each region. Under Nash
conjecture, we can consider this policy game as simultaneous. With full information
each region chooses its optimal strategy according to its best response.
The maximization problem for region j with equalization is
max
sj
Wj(t) (4.1)
where Wj(t) is defined in equation (3.7). As noted above, Wj(t) defines social welfare
in region j under the economic dynamics and equalization rule described in Section
3 and in detail in Appendix A. Under our behavioural assumptions, region j takes
account of the impact of its choice of sj on its contribution to the central pool, its
equalization grant and its produced output over the fixed horizon t = 0, . . . , T . To be
specific, region j acts strategically with respect to the equalization policy rule.
Before deriving the solution to this maximization problem it is useful to consider
the following proposition:
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Proposition 1. The net transfer is a decreasing function of saving rate. Specifically,
ρj,s(t) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
This tells us that if region j increases saving rate, it decreases its per capita net
transfer. As shown in the proof, this holds without restriction for both regions regard-
less of their relative outputs. It means that region j can increase its net transfer by
reducing its saving rate which leads to lower output. Now consider the next proposition:
Proposition 2. The optimal saving rate in region j, s∗j , satisfies∫ T
0
exp (−δt)uj,xjLjρj,s(t)dt+
∫ T
0
exp (−δt)uj,xjYj(t)dt
=
∫ T
0
exp (−δt)uj,xj(1− sj)Yj,sdt
(4.2)
for j = 1, 2.
Proof. See Appendix C
The first order condition for sj characterizes two best response functions, sˆ1 =
sˆ1 (s2) and sˆ2 = sˆ2 (s1), between the strategy of a region and that of its neighbour. A
Nash equilibrium to the policy game is, therefore, a solution, s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2), such that
s∗1 = sˆ1 (s
∗
2), s
∗
2 = sˆ2 (s
∗
1).
The first term on the left side is the change in the net transfer to region j resulting
from an incremental increase in sj per unit of income. From Proposition 1, ρj,sj < 0,
for j = 1, 2, so the region will consider this to be a marginal cost from an incremental
increase in sj. The second term on the left side captures the change in produced output
available for public and private good consumption arising from an increase in sj. An
increase in the saving rate means that the proportion of produced output available to
consume public and private goods at time t is smaller. Therefore, the region will also
consider this to be a marginal cost of an increase in its savings rate. The term on
the right side of equation (4.2) captures the effect of an incremental increase in the
saving rate on output. This is a marginal benefit of increasing the saving rate since it
increases capital accumulation and hence output.
In summary, the left side of the first order necessary condition for sj captures
the total marginal cost of increasing the saving rate in region j. It consists of an
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equalization cost in terms of lost net transfer and a cost arising from lower output at
time t. The right hand side captures the marginal benefit of increasing the saving rate in
terms of a marginal increase in regional output because of higher capital accumulation.
In choosing its optimal saving rate region j equates the sum of these two marginal
costs with the single marginal benefit.
Now consider the scenario where there is no fiscal equalization policy rule and
ρj(t) = 0 for all j and t. In this scenario the regions are two separate economies and
regional decision makers have dominant strategies with regard to their choice of saving
rate. It is straight forward to show that the first order condition for sj becomes∫ T
0
exp (−δt)uj,xjYj(t)dt =
∫ T
0
exp (−δt)uj,xj(1− sj)Yj,sdt (4.3)
for j = 1, 2. An equilibrium is a solution, s0j , that solves equation (4.3) for j = 1, 2.
The left side is the change in produced output available for public and private good
consumption arising from an increase in sj. The region will consider this to be a
marginal cost of a higher saving rate. The right side is the marginal benefit of an
incremental increase in the saving rate in terms of capital accumulation and output.
The region considers this to be a marginal benefit of increasing its savings rate. As
with the scenario with the equalization plicy rule in place, regions choose their saving
rate to equate marginal cost and benefit.
By comparing equations (4.2) and (4.3), one can see equalization introduces an ad-
ditional marginal cost of an increase in sj, namely,
∫ T
0
exp (−δt)uj,xjLjρj,s(t)dt, without
any corresponding marginal benefit. This allows us to conclude with the following
Proposition 3. Equalization induces regions to under-save relative to the case where
there is no equalization policy rule.
Proof. From equations (4.2) and (4.3) above, s∗j < s
0
j , for j = 1, 2.
Since capital accumulation and per capita output are increasing sj it follows that
they too are smaller during the fixed time horizon t = 0, ...., T under an equalization
policy rule relative to the scenario with no equalization. It can be concluded, therefore,
that real world RTS equalization induces lower regional savings rates, capital accumu-
lation and per capita regional output over t = 0, ...., T . The smaller saving rate also
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leads to a lower growth rate in total output than the scenario with no equalization.10
5 Conclusion
We conclude by noting that these theoretical results should not necessarily be taken
to imply that countries are unwise on economic grounds to equalize their sub-national
regions using RTS-type schemes. This is because equalization may achieve important
inter-regional equity, political, national citizenship or other objectives not captured in
our model. Moreover, as highlighted in the fiscal federalism literature, the transfers
induced by equalization may be efficiency enhancing if there are fiscal externalities
associated with inter-regional migration and/or if regions collect economic rents and
disburse them on the basis of residency. This has been shown using static models of
regional economies as in, for example, Boadway and Flatters (1982), Myers (1990),
Caplan et al. (2000) and Boadway et al. (2003). Since we assume in our model above
that factors of production are immobile we do not allow for the possibility that transfers
can also, potentially, result in spatial efficiency gains. Future extensions of our model
may allow for factor mobility so that the distortions to savings and capital accumulation
we capture can be considered within this wider context.
Nevertheless, for now the results in this note at least suggest that if equalization
is implemented to support these other objectives it may have inter-temporal costs in
terms of distortions to regional savings, capital accumulation and the growth rate in
total output. This potential inter-temporal cost of equalization has not been empha-
sised previously in the literature yet may be important to consider in theoretical and
policy debates over the general benefits and costs of fiscal equalization in decentralized
economies, such as federations.
10For a comprehensive analysis on the relationship between growth in total output and the saving
rate, see Romer (2001).
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Appendix A: Equalization policy rule
The specific equalization rule we consider is a stylized variant of the Australian
model which, as noted in the main text, is an application of an RTS-type approach.
Under this model, the grant received by a region, which we will calls states for the
purposes of this Appendix, has two components; a revenue sharing equal per capita
grant and an equalization grant based on revenue needs which is explicitly redistributive
from high to low income states. It should be noted that as the Australian model is an
application of the RTS approach our results do not depend on its adoption. It should
also be noted that since the model below also incorporates an equal per capita grant to
a state it is really a revenue sharing and equalization scheme, though for the purposes
of brevity it is referred to simply as an equalization scheme.
Let us suppose a central government appropriates a portion of the output of state
j, at a rate 0 < φ < 1, which we assume to be a parameter independent of time. This
appropriation captures the complex myriad of taxes used by central governments in
practice to raise revenue. The per capita appropriation from the people of state j is,
τj (t) = φ
Yj(t)
Lj(t)
, j = 1, 2. (A.1)
Total revenue collected from all citizens is
G (t) = φ
2∑
j=1
Yj(t) =
2∑
j=1
Lj(t)τj(t). (A.2)
In practice, central governments use the revenue they collect to provide services.
Any surplus of revenue after the central government’s own activities - known as the
fiscal gap - would be returned to the states as grants. We abstract from this com-
plexity by supposing all centrally collected revenue is redistributed to the states as
untied grants according to an revenue sharing-equalization formula.11 An implication
is that the central government in our model provides no services. Its sole function is to
appropriate revenue and create a revenue pool which is then distributed to the states.
The discussion now focuses on each state separately, commencing with state 1. Let
the per capita grant received by state 1 be defined as
g1 (t) =
G (t)
L(t)
+ ξ (t) [1− ν1 (t)] j = 1, 2. (A.3)
11To assume otherwise requires explicit modelling of the central government and the provision of
at least one national public good. This extension can be undertaken but it adds complexity that
obscures the results.
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Each component of the right hand side of the expression is explained below. 12
a. Revenue sharing component: The first term, G (t) /L(t), is an equal per capita share
of the revenue pool allocated to all citizens of the country regardless of where they
live. This can be thought of as the revenue sharing part of the grant received by
a region. It is not explicitly redistributive, as is the equalization part of the grant
expression, discussed in (b) to (d) below. However, it implicitly redistributes income
across regions when per capita region incomes differ and each region makes the same
per capita contribution to the central grant pool, as in our model.
b. Own-source revenue per capita: The second term. ξ (t), is the total per capita tax
revenue raised by both states, which can also be thought of as an average state tax
rate. It is defined as
ξ (t) =
1
L(t)
[Q (t)−G (t)] j = 1, 2. (A.4)
In this expression, Q (t) is total state spending on local public goods, G (t) is the
revenue pool previously defined and L(t) is total national population. It is assumed
that total state spending exceeds the revenue pool, implying states raise positive
own-source revenues; hence Q (t) − G (t) > 0 so ξ (t) > 0. Further, define total
public good spending as
Q (t) =
2∑
j=1
cjqj (t) (A.5)
where qj (t) are quantities of local public goods provided by state j. The price of
the local public good in state 1, c1, is assumed to be a parameter, as is c2, the local
public good price for state 2.
c. Revenue disability: Finally, ν1 (t) is a measure of the strength of the tax base in
state j relative to the total state tax base. We adopt per capita state output as a
proxy for state tax bases. The disability is the ratio of per capita output in state 1
to per capita national output. This means:
ν1 (t) =
Yj(t)
Lj(t)
L(t)
Y (t)
. (A.6)
If per capita output in state 1 exceeds per capita national output, because state 1 has
comparatively high per capita income, then ν1 (t) > 1. However, if per capita output
12Equation (A.3) is based on the Australian equalization model (see Commonwealth Grants Com-
mission (2015a)). That model also estimates expenditure, net investment and net lending needs. In
this way, it actually equalizes net financial worth across the Australian states and territories. By fo-
cussing on the revenue equalization component we abstract from these other aspects and the potential
for them to be a source of additional distortions to regional decisions.
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in state 1 is less than per capita national output, because state 1 has relatively low
per capita income, then ν1 (t) < 1. From the construction of the revenue disability
variable at equation (A.6), it follows that:
ν1 (t) > 1⇒ ν2 (t) < 1
ν1 (t) < 1⇒ ν2 (t) > 1.
(A.7)
The revenue disability for state 1 is also a function of the joint policy choices of the
two states since Y (t) is an implicit function of s1 and s2, as by implication, is the
analogous revenue disability for state 2.
d. Revenue need: Given the above definitions, the term ξ (t) [1− ν1 (t)] in equation
(A.3) is the revenue need of state 1, or the equalization component of the grant
expression. In the event that ν1 (t) > 1, then ξ (t) [1− ν1 (t)] < 0 and the revenue
need of state 1 is negative. From equation (A.3) this ensures the per capita grant to
state 1 is below its revenue sharing entitlement. If ν1 (t) < 1, then ξ (t) [1− ν1 (t)] >
0, and state 1 has a positive revenue need. This ensures its actual per capita grant is
above the per capita revenue sharing grant. Hence, the revenue need is the explicitly
redistributive equalization component of the total grant to state j. It redistributes
output from the rich to poor state by adding to, or subtracting from, a state’s
revenue sharing component - the equal per capita part of the grant expression.
The degree of redistribution can be measured as a net transfer to each state which
is positive or negative, depending on whether a state is poor or rich. Accordingly, we
define the per capita net transfer to state 1 as
ρ1 (t) = g1 (t)− τ1 (t) . (A.8)
There is also a balanced transfer constraint, L2(t)ρ2 (t) = −L1(t)ρ1 (t), which im-
plies that the net transfer to state 2 is simply
ρ2 (t) = −L1(t)
L2(t)
ρ1 (t) . (A.9)
From this, the central grant pool is automatically exhausted by grants to the states
and hence G (t) = L1(t)g1 (t) + L2(t)g2 (t) holds. This means there is no need for a
separate balanced grant constraint in the maximization problem presented later.
Following from the construction above, it is possible to derive a more mathemati-
cally conveniently expression for the net transfer. Specifically, by direct manipulation,
ρj(t) =
(
1− Yj(t)
Lj(t)
L(t)
Y (t)
)
Q(t)
L(t)
. (A.10)
Appendix B: Household Maximisation
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Let uj(xj(t), qj(t)) be the utility function with xj(t) and qj(t) denote the total public
and private good consumptions in state j at time t. So the maximisation problem is
max
xj(t),qj(t)
uj(xj(t), qj(t))
s.t. xj(t) + cjqj(t) = (1− sj)Yj(t) + Ljρj(t)
The Lagrangian function associated with this problem is
L = uj(xj(t), qj(t)) + λ [(1− sj)Yj(t) + Ljρj(t)− xj(t)− cjqj(t)] . (B.1)
The First Order Necessary Conditions are:
uj,xj − λ =0 (B.2)
uj,qj + λ
[
Ljρj,qj − cj
]
=0 (B.3)
(1− sj)Yj + Ljρj − xj − cjqj =0 (B.4)
Note that FONC (B.4) implies that x∗j,qj = Ljρj,qj − cj and λ∗ = uj,xj . Therefore
provision of local public goods in region j must satisfy
uj,qj + uj,xjx
∗
j,qj
= 0.. (B.5)
Appendix C: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1 : By direct calculation
ρj,s(t) = −
[
1− Yj(t)
Y (t)
]
Q(t)
Y (t)
Yj,s(t)
Lj(t)
.
Let
ξj(t) = −
[
1− Yj(t)
Y (t)
]
Q(t)
Y (t)Lj(t)
and note that ξ(t) < 0 for all t. Moreover, Yj,s(t) = Yj,Kj(t)Kj,s, then
ρj,s = ξ(t)Yj,KjKj,s.
Since Yj,Kj > 0 and Kj,s > 0 under the standard Solow-Swan assumptions, this gives
the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2: The optimization problem is
max
sj
∫ T
0
exp (−δt)Vj(t)dt (C.1)
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where Vj(t) = uj(x
∗(t), q∗(t)) is the indirect utility function. Then the first order
condition is ∫ T
0
exp (−δt)Vj,s(t)dt = 0
where
Vj,s =λ
∗ (−Yj + (1− sj)Yj,s + Ljρj,s)
=uj,xj (−Yj + (1− sj)Yj,s + Ljρj,s)
by the Envelop Theorem. Therefore, the FONC is∫ T
0
exp (−δt) [uj,xj (−Yj + (1− sj)Yj,s + Ljρj,s)] dt = 0. (C.2)
By direct manipulation,∫ T
0
exp (−δt) [uj,xj (−Yj + (1− sj)Yj,s + Ljξ(t)Yj.s)] dt = 0.∫ T
0
exp (−δt)
{
uj,xj
[
−Yj +
(
1− sj − Y−j(t)
Y (t)
Q(t)
Y (t)
)
Yj,s
]}
dt = 0∫ T
0
exp (−δt)uj,xj
Y−j(t)
Y (t)
Q(t)
Y (t)
Yj,sdt+
∫ T
0
exp (−δt)uj,xjYj(t)dt
=
∫ T
0
exp (−δt)uj,xj(1− sj)Yj,sdt.

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